

Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ERDA-07 AF-10 ARA-14 CIAE-00
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INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
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AMEMBASSY TOKYO
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E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PARM, CCD
SUBJ: CCD: 765TH PLENARY MEETING, AUGUST 25, 1977

1. SUMMARY: IN AUGUST 25 CCD PLENARY, PAKISTANI REP GAVE
STATEMENT ON NON-PROLIFERATION, NUCLEAR COOPERATION, NUCLEAR
SECURITY ASSURANCES, AND NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONES. FRG REP
ADDRESSED VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS OF A CW BAN. MEXICAN REP
SPOKE ABOUT A COMPREHENSIVE NEGOTIATING PROGRAM (CNP) OF ARMS
CONTROL MEASURES, INTRODUCING AND SUMMARIZING A MEXICAN WORK-
ING PAPER ON THE SUBJECT. COMMITTEE TOOK CONSENSUS DECISION
TO ESTABLISH A CNP WORKING GROUP AT THE BEGINNING OF ITS
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SPRING 1978 SESSION. END SUMMARY

2. PAKISTANI REP (YUNUS) EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT WITH THE
MAJOR NUCLEAR POWERS' EMPHASIS ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY
(NPT) AND UNILATERAL CONTROLS AND RESTRAINTS ON THE TRANSFER
OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY ESTABLISHED BY THE LONDON SUPPLIERS
GROUP, SAYING THAT THESE MEASURES COULD CREATE A FALSE SENSE

OF CONFIDENCE IN THE PROPOSED NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME. PAKISTAN HAD SUPPORTED ADOPTION OF THE NPT IN THE 1968 UNGA. PAKISTANI REP INDICATED, BUT HAD THEN AND SINCE MAINTAINED THAT THE NPT COULD NOT PROVE AN EFFECTIVE BARRIER AGAINST NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION UNTIL THE MAJOR THRESHOLD POWERS BECOME PARTIES AND UNTIL THE SECURITY OF NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES (NNWS) WAS EFFECTIVELY SAFEGUARDED. THE THRESHOLD POWERS HAVE NOT ADHERED, PAKISTANI REP STATED, AND, IN SPITE OF PAKISTAN'S EFFORTS TO PROMOTE NUCLEAR SECURITY ASSURANCES FOR NNWS, NO PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE AND ALL NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES (NWS) EXCEPT CHINA HAVE MAINTAINED AN ATTITUDE OF INDIFFERENCE.

3. PAKISTANI REP TOOK STRONG EXCEPTION TO THE NEW POLICY OF RESTRAINTS ON TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY; QUOTE THE NEW POLICY OF RESTRAINTS AND EMBARGOS ON THE TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY, DESPITE THE IMPOSITION OF INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS, CANNOT BE SUCCESSFUL FOR SEVERAL REASONS. FIRST, IT CONTRAVENES THE PRINCIPLE OF THE SOVEREIGNTY OF STATES; SECOND, IT VIOLATES THE "BARGAIN" BETWEEN THE NUCLEAR "HAVES" AND "HAVE NOTS" EMBODIED IN THE NPT AND THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS; THIRD, IT INVOLVED DISCRIMINATION NOT ONLY BETWEEN NUCLEAR AND NON-NUCLEAR STATES BUT EVEN AMONG NON-NUCLEAR STATES; AND FOURTH, THIS POLICY CAN ONLY BE CONSTRUED AS AN EFFORT TO DENY THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY TO THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.

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I HAVE SET OUT THIS POINT IN ORDER TO EXPLAIN THAT SUCH A POLICY CAN HARDLY BE EXPECTED TO SECURE GENERAL ACCEPTANCE OR COMPLIANCE, REGARDLESS OF ALL THE PRESSURES AND INDUCEMENTS EXERCISED ON INDIVIDUAL STATES. SOONER, RATHER THAN LATER, THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ARE BOUND TO ADOPT A COMMON POSITION ON THIS ISSUE, THEREBY LEADING TO FURTHER DIFFICULTIES IN NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS.

IN ANY CASE, RESTRICTIONS ON THE TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY CAN BE AT BEST ONLY A SHORT TERM AND PARTIAL ANSWER TO THE PROBLEM OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION. THE SO-CALLED "SENSITIVE" TECHNOLOGIES, SUCH AS PLUTONIUM REPROCESSING, ARE IN FACT AVAILABLE FROM PUBLIC SOURCES. THE ACQUISITION OF THIS TECHNOLOGY BY AN INCREASING NUMBER OF STATES CANNOT BE PREVENTED THROUGH PRESSURES. THE BEST COURSE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IS TO ENSURE THAT THIS AND OTHER NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY IS ACQUIRED UNDER THE NECESSARY CONTROLS AND SAFEGUARDS. UNQUOTE

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4. IN REGARD TO THE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE EVALUA-
TION PROGRAM (INFCEP) PROPOSED BY THE US, PAKISTANI REP
STATED THAT HIS GOVT HAD GIVEN IT DUE CONSIDERATION, BUT BE-
LIEVES THAT IT PROCEEDS FROM AN INCORRECT PREMISE: THAT PLU-
TONIUM REPROCESSING PLANTS AND BREEDER REACTORS ARE "BAD".
REFERRING TO THE JAPANESE CCD STATEMENT OF AUGUST 11 AND STAT-
ING THAT "PLUTONIUM REPROCESSING IS A PROVEN AND WELL ESTAB-
LISHED TECHNOLOGY WHICH IS ESSENTIAL FOR MANY FUEL-DEFICIENT
NON-NUCLEAR STATES," PAKISTANI REP DECLARED THAT IT WOULD HAVE
BEEN BETTER TO UNDERTAKE THE INFCEP WITHIN THE UN SYSTEM, FOR
INSTANCE UNDER THE IAEA, AND THAT "THE ONLY DURABLE SOLUTION
TO THE PROBLEM OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION LIES IN BUILDING AN
INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE OF TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN WHICH
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NATIONS WOULD NOT FEEL THE NEED TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS."

5. TO ACHIEVE THIS, PAKISTANI REP STATED, IT IS NECESSARY TO

END THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE, REDUCE ARMS LEVELS IMMEDIATELY, CONCENTRATING ON NUCLEAR ARMS, AND INITIATE MOVES TOWARD THEIR EVENTUAL DESTRUCTION AND COMPLETE ELIMINATION. PAKISTANI REP INDICATED THAT RESPONSIBILITY FOR DOING THIS, AS RECOGNIZED IN ARTICLE VI OF THE NPT, RESTS WITH THE TWO SUPERPOWERS, SO AS "TO CREATE A CLIMATE OF CONFIDENCE IN WHICH THE OTHER NUCLEAR STATES COULD BE CONVINCED TO JOIN IN THE EFFORTS TO PROMOTE GLOBAL DISARMAMENT."

6. FIRST OF ALL, PAKISTANI REP DECLARED, A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN (CTB) TREATY MUST BE CONCLUDED: QUOTE THE PRIMARY CONDITION NECESSARY FOR THE SUCCESS OF SUCH A TREATY IS THAT THE TWO SUPERPOWERS SHOULD AGREE TO SUSPEND NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS. SINCE THEY ARE TECHNOLOGICALLY FAR IN ADVANCE OF THE OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS AN IMMEDIATE SUSPENSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS BY THE TWO WOULD IN NO WAY JEOPARDIZE THEIR SECURITY. IT WOULD, AT THE SAME TIME, CONSTITUTE A MANIFESTATION OF THEIR SINCERITY IN SEEKING TO HALT THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE AND TO INDUCE OTHER NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES TO JOIN IN THE GENERAL PROHIBITION. UNQUOTE.

7. UNLESS THE NNWS ARE REASSURED AGAINST THE THREAT OR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY CREDIBLE AND BINDING GUARANTEES, PAKISTANI REP STATED, "THE NUCLEAR THREAT TO THEM IS BOUND TO MOUNT." INDICATING THAT PAKISTAN HAS IN THE PAST MADE SEVERAL EFFORTS TO PROMOTE CONSENSUS ON THIS POINT, PAKISTANI REP SAID THAT HIS VIEWS REMAIN THOSE SET FORTH IN HIS CCD STATEMENT OF APRIL 28.

8. TURNING TO THE QUESTION OF NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONES
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(NWFZ'S), PAKISTANI REP DECLARED THAT NNWS SHOULD TAKE INITIATIVES TOWARD REGIONAL SECURITY AGAINST THE NUCLEAR THREAT BY ESTABLISHING SUCH ZONES, WHICH HE SAID PROVIDE THE BEST AVAILABLE APPROACH TO PREVENT NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION. TAKING ISSUE WITH CERTAIN NWFZ PRINCIPLES ADVANCED BY SOME NWS AND THEIR ALLIES, THAT PRIOR AGREEMENT OF ALL REGIONAL STATES IS REQUIRED FOR AN NWFZ AND THAT THE CREATION OF AN NWFZ SHOULD NOT PREJUDICE EXISTING SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, PAKISTANI REP DECLARED THAT "THESE PRE-CONDITIONS HAVE OPERATED TO RETARD THE CREATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPON FREE ZONES IN SOUTH ASIA, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND AFRICA. MY GOVERNMENT BELIEVES THAT IF THE PRINCIPLE OF THE CREATION OF SUCH ZONES IS ACCEPTED AS A DESIRABLE GOAL, THEN IT SHOULD BE PURSUED AND PROMOTED REGARDLESS OF THE RESERVATIONS OF ONE OR TWO REGIONAL STATES. SINCE DE-NUCLEARIZATION IS OBVIOUSLY AN ACCEPTED OBJECTIVE IN THE NPT FOR ALL NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES, IS ACHIEVEMENT IN ANY PARTICULAR REGION CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS CONTRARY TO "EXISTING SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS."

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9. CONCLUDING, PAKISTANI REP STATED THAT AT THE 32ND UNGA
PAKISTAN WILL INTRODUCE PRINCIPLES FOR PROMOTING NUCLEAR COO-
PERATION WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF NON-PROLIFERATION RESTRAINTS.

10. FRG REP (SCHLAICH) STATED THAT THE INTENSIFIED US-SOVIET
BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) GIVE HOPE
THAT A BASIS WILL SOON BE ESTABLISHED FOR MULTILATERAL NEGO-
TIATIONS IN CCD, BUT THAT IN THE MEANTIME THE BRITISH DRAFT

TREATY AFFORDS SUBSTANTIAL GROUND FOR DISCUSSIONS IN THE COMMITTEE. INDICATING THAT STATISTICAL MEANS WILL BE OF SOME VALUE IN CW VERIFICATION, FRG REP SAID THAT THEIR IMPORTANCE SHOULD NOT BE OVEREMPHASIZED, AND THAT IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS UNCLASSIFIED

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A CW VERIFICATION SYSTEM WILL NOT BE SUFFICIENTLY EFFECTIVE WITHOUT INTERNATIONAL ON-SITE INSPECTIONS. TO FACILITATE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING, FRG REP STATED, SUCH INSPECTIONS SHOULD BE ON A REGULAR BASIS RATHER THAN REQUIRING A SPECIFIC CHALLENGE.

11. FRG REP EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT A SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL ON-SITE INSPECTIONS CAN BE DIVISED WITHOUT ENDANGERING LEGITIMATE COMMERCIAL AND MILITARY SECRETS. THIS PROVED TO BE THE CASE, FRG REP STATED, WITH RESPECT TO NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS ADMINISTERED BY THE IAEA.

12. FRG REP, STATING THAT FOR TECHNICAL REASONS THE PROCESS OF STOCKPILE DESTRUCTION WOULD TAKE QUITE SOME TIME, ADVOCATED A REVIEW OF THE CW CONVENTION'S EFFECTIVENESS AFTER SEVERAL YEARS, BUT BEFORE COMPLETION OF THE DESTRUCTION PROCESS.

13. FRG REP WELCOMED THE PROPOSAL THAT CERTAIN CHEMICAL PRECURSORS RELEVANT TO THE MANUFACTURE OF CW AGENTS SHOULD BE INCLUDED WITHIN THE SCOPE OF PROHIBITION, SAYING THAT THERE SEEMS TO BE GENERAL SUPPORT FOR THE VIEW THAT THE CONVENTION SHOULD FROM THE OUTSET BAN NOT ONLY SUPERTOXIC BUT ALSO OTHER LETHAL AND HIGHLY TOXIC CHEMICALS, AS WELL AS INCAPACITANTS AND BINARY WEAPONS. IN SUGGESTING CRITERIA IN ADDITION TO THE TOXICITY LEVELS, FRG REP STATED, THE FRG'S MOTIVATION HAD BEEN TO EXCLUDE HIGHLY TOXIC SUBSTANCES WHOSE OTHER CHARACTERISTICS MAKE THEM UNSUITABLE, FOR USE AS CW AGENTS. TO INCLUDE SUCH SUBSTANCES, FRG REP REMARKED, WOULD PLACE AN UNNECESSARY BURDEN ON INDUSTRY AND ON THE VERIFICATION REGIME.

14. MEXICAN REP (GARCIA ROBLES), INTRODUCING A MEXICAN WORKING PAPER (CCD/545) ON A COMPREHENSIVE NEGOTIATING PROGRAM (CNP) OF ARMS CONTROL MEASURES, STATED THAT EIGHTY UNCLASSIFIED

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PERCENT OF IT WAS THE SAME AS THE 1970 UNGA PAPER (DOCUMENT NUMBER A/8191) INTRODUCED BY SIX NONALIGNED COUNTRIES (IRELAND, MEXICO, MOROCCO, PAKISTAN, SWEDEN, AND YUGOSLAVIA). MOST OF THE REMAINING TWENTY PERCENT, HE SAID, AMOUNTS TO AN UPDATE COVERING EVENTS WHICH HAVE OCCURRED SINCE 1970.

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15. HOWEVER, MEXICAN REP DID POINT OUT ONE SPECIFIC CHANGE,
DIVISION OF SECTION III(B) OF THE CNP INTO TWO SUB-HEADINGS:
(1) MEASURES FOR WHOSE IMPLEMENTATION THE POLITICAL WILL OF
THE TWO PRINCIPAL NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES IS ESSENTIAL; AND (2)
MEASURES FOR WHICH THE POLITICAL WILL OF THE STATES DIRECTLY
CONCERNED MAY BE SUFFICIENT. THIS, HE SAID, WAS DONE IN ORDER
TO GIVE A CLEARER ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROGRESS
IN THE FIELD OF ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT.

16. IN ADDITION, MEXICAN REP INDICATED THAT PRINCIPLE TEN
UNDER TOMAN NUMERAL II ("APPROPRIATE CHANGES SHOULD BE MADE
IN THE ORGANIZATION AND PROCEDURES OF MULTILATERAL ORGANS OF
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NEGOTIATION ON DISARMAMENT IN ORDER TO SECURE THE PARTICIPATION OF ALL NUCLEAR-WEAPON STATES") SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD TO IMPLY FIRST OF ALL ABOLITION OF THE US-SOVIET CO-CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE CCD, A STEP WHICH HE SAID HAD BEEN MADE MOSSN#

BY THE VERY IMPORTANT RECENT STATEMENT OF THE FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTER.

17. IN SUBSTANCE, MEXICAN REP DECLARED, THE CNP WOULD HAVE TO BE ANALOGOUS TO THE PROGRAM OF ACTION ADOPTED BY THE UNGA SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT (SSOD), BUT IN FORM IT WOULD BE DIFFERENT: THE CNP WORKED OUT BY CCD WOULD BE GENERAL AND BROAD IN SCOPE, BUT THE PROGRAM OF ACTION ADOPTED BY THE SSOD SHOULD REPRESENT A VERY CAREFUL SELECTION OF PRESSING MEASURES HAVING SPECIAL IMPORTANCE AND ON WHICH ACTION SHOULD BE TAKEN IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

18. AFTER INTERRUPTING THE PLENARY MEETING FOR ITS INFORMAL MEETING ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS (REPORTED SEPTEL), DURING WHICH TIME A NUMBER OF DELS (NOTABLY, FRG AND HUNGARIAN REPS) CARRIED OUT PRIVATE CONSULTATIONS ON THE QUESTION OF A CNP WORKING GROUP, THE COMMITTEE ADOPTED THE FOLLOWING DECISION BY CONSENSUS: QUOTE THE CCD TAKES NOTE OF THE CONSENSUS REACHED AMONG THE MEMBER STATES OF THE COMMITTEE TTHAT AT THE BEGINNING OF ITS PRING SESSION OF 1978, AN AD HOC WORKING GROUP WILL BE ESTABLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH ITS PROCEDURAL DECISION ADOPTED AT THE 746TH MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE ON 21 APRIL 1977 (CCD/532) TO DISCUSS AND ELABORATE A DRAFT COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM OF DISARMAMENT TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE CCD FOR CONSIDERATION. UNQUOTE

19. THE COMMITTEE ALSO OFFICIALLY DECIDED TO CLOSE THE SUMMER SESSION ON TUESDAY, AUGUST 30, AT THE END OF ITS NEXT UNCLASSIFIED

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PLENARY MEETING.VANDEN HEUVEL

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Message Attributes

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